Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harré,R./Madden,E.H, Hecato and Nicholas Hill
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17 ideas
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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15286
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Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
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15283
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Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
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15316
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The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
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15298
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We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
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15225
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Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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15255
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Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
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15270
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Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
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15284
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Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden]
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15285
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The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden]
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15287
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The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
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15306
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Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
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15293
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If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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15294
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Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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15254
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If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
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15317
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Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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15310
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Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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15219
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Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden]
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